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STATEMENT OF CASE
Appellants
decision

of

are appealing

the

Supreme

only

Court

from that portion

of

the

State

of the

of Utah

filed

September 10, 1987 which affirms the summary judgment in favor of
defendant I.H.C. Hospitals, Inc.
This was an appeal from an order granting summary judgment
against the plaintiffs in that the statue of limitations barred
the causes of action.
In the opinion of the Supreme Court filed September 10,
1987, the order granting summary judgment against Dr. Brown was
reversed,

but

the

court,

being

equally

divided

as

to

the

plaintiffs claim against I.H.C, affirmed the summary judgment as
to that defendant.
22,

1980

and

The plaintiff's hysterectomy occurred October

hospitalization

followed.

In

July

of

1981,

plaintiff Saundra Brower sought emergency medical treatment at
Kanab

hospital

with

blood

clot

problems

arising

out

of

an

injection and puncture in her leg she received while in the
hospital recovery room on October 22, 1980.
Plaintiffs gave the 90 days statutory notice of intent on
February 16, 1983 and filed their action June 14, 1984.
Plaintiffs

contend

that

the

negligence

of

the

hospital

relative to the injection and puncture were not discovered until
July 1981.

i
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
While in the recovery room in October 1980 at the I.H.C.
hospital in Cedar City, plaintiff Saundra Brower received some
type

of

injection

variously

referred

to

as

aflKlf

shot

or

injection. She was not conscious at the time, but It was given
while in the recovery room recovering from the hysterectomy.
Plaintiff's sister and husband saw the amount of blood spurting
from her thigh (deposition of Saundra Brower, pg. 94 lines 2-4).
The Court in its opinion has reviewed the facts of the
matter.
The

injection, whatever

it was, was part of a

package" treatment given to plaintiff.

"single

Plaintiff had no way of

separating the injection from the other treatment received at the
hands of her Doctor, Dr. Brown.

She surrendered herself into

the hands of Dr. Brown, who placed her in the hospital where the
surgery was performed.
proceedings.

Dr. Brown tended her through all of the

She had no way of knowing until July of 1981 that

something was wrong in this "single package" course of treatment.
Dr. Brown had been advised of the puncture wound, but did not
respond.

Plaintiff therefore, could only assume that it was part

of the treatment for her illness and was not alerted to, nor
became

aware

that

anything

was

wrong,

until

the

emergency

hospital treatment in July of 1981 when she was advised of the
negligence of whoever administered the injection to her.

Nothing

had happened prior to that time to lead her to believe that there
was anything wrong other than the usual recovery problems.
2
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The matter should have been treated as a single course of
conduct or transaction; and the trier of fact should determine,
as the legislature intended, whether the plaintiff knew or should
have known at the time of the injection of the negligence of the
defendant I.H.C. (Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78-12-47 (1987).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT'S CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN TREATED
AS ONE TRANSACTION BY THE REVIEWING COURT.

Since

the

legislature

has

established

the

method

for

determining cases of this type, as to whether the plaintiff has
met the statue of limitations problem, the Court should have
allowed the trier fact to determine the question to the statue of
limitations.

The procedure has been expressly set up by the

i

legislature for determination of when the Plaintiff should have
discovered the injury (Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78-12-47 (1987).
An analogy can be drawn between the cases involving the
leaving

of

the

broken

surgical

needles, sponges, and

foreign matters inside the body of a patient.
some material

<

other

The depositing of

inside of a patient's body by injection is no

<

different than leaving of a sponge or some form of material
inside a body.
•

'

"

•

• •

In one case, the body opening is closed up
•

"

"

- '

<
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injected
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different
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of
.Hid
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inject ion
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t h€ t

puncture wound,

* nstanee

is

- *

if a m

ly
r

created

ho

needle
Further

reed.*-

instruF-e-' *
Since

in

damaa*

of

i tself

can,

:i nerve or other tissue

the damage

similar

and

of the

as

a

sharp

I n the

body.

v:i si 01 i of the pa t :i ei i t :i t :i s

In surgery i n that the actual injury may occur

1 lit* buiI\

inside

I In (Idlimine m a y b e II e f t :i risi de the body, as it n the case

of a foreign object being
negliqence

**- a

th»* body

-\ **

in a surgical procedure itself, which

.

nt

;?

ase (if

afterwards

hidden by being sutured.
Is

there

really

a distinction between

T

the two?

~

**u~

v ii, fhf- snrq i t,\i I procedure, :i J: we can so alludf **

ii'istanl'

is done by a needle.

I lie discover y o; t/ie negl igence

discovered until July 1981 t which was well within the statue
limitations.
The Court has cited the case of Christensen vs Rees
2d, 435 (Utah ] ..968)

43 6 r

That case is authority for ^ - nropositi' n

that the statue of li m itations does no; v.: ;..
patient has learned of the presence :-f a foreign obie.'t, *M;:r, in
t: I la t case was a h

*r > • , ;.i,irfci

'it--* s ••

•v

ina I O U S n I

that Plaintiff did not Jearn of the presence, presumdb*y
• -inc.
oody ,

substance.

. 1-"

;1

1

or damage '
i

5

np

i some

? nt er ior ti ssues of her
- • *rr «JI^JI.

.iuspitaiization.
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»*-ci pi tat' ad

In the Case of Ruth vs Dicrht. et. al. 75 Washington 2d 660,
435 P. 2d 631 (Washington 1969), the Washington Supreme Court
held that the statue of limitations commences to run when the
patient discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable care for his
own health and welfare should have discovered the presence of a
substance or article in his body.
the patient's body.
the sponge was made.

A surgical sponge was left in

Some 20 years elapsed, until discovery of
During that period of time, the patient

sought continued medical assistance, to no avail.

In addition

the patient had extreme pain and distress.
There is no difference between a foreign object left in a
body through surgical means after which the cavity if sutured and
the placement of a foreign or harmful object or substance in the
body by injection, or damage of interior body tissue, by needle.
A small blood spurt per se from an injection certainly does not
put the patient on notice of some impending problem within the
body where the needle was injected.
been

made,

but

no

response

Especially, when inquiry had

received

from

Dr.

Brown.

The

plaintiff assumed by the lack of interest of the defendants that
there was no problem, and that this was a normal, expected part
of the whole transactional hysterectomy procedure.
The Ruth Court, supra at pages 436, 437, stated, " Unless
the legislature has acted affirmatively, the Court should attempt
to strike a balance between harm to the person who would not in
the usual course of events know he had been wronged until long
after the statue of limitations had cut off his legal remedies,
5
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or being deprived of remedy versus harm of being sued. . ."
The Ruth Court also discussed the concepts of fundamental
fairness and the common law purpose to provide a remedy for every
genuine wrong.

This latter overriding concept tempers our common

law system, and the implementation of statutory law relative
thereto.
Hence, the hysterectomy hospitalization and events related
thereto, while different causes of action should be treated as
one single transaction, or course of conduct and the trier of
fact should determine when the plaintiff knew or should have
known of the negligence of I.H.C.
There is no difference between the implantation into the
body of some harmful or foreign substance, and leaving a foreign
object

in

difference
patient's

the

body

between
body,

after
an

created

surgery;

injury
by

to

a

conversely

tissue

needle

and

or
an

there

is

no

otherwise

in

injury

created

negligently during surgery which is afterwards sutured.

a

The

patient could have an infected or bloody incision, and assume it
is a normal part of the surgical process.

POINT II
THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE REVERSED THE MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO DEFENDANT.
The Supreme Court of Washington in the case of Ohler vs.
Tecoma General Hospital, et. al 92 Wash 2d 507, 598 P. 2d 1358
(Washington 1979), in a case involving administration of oxygen
6
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to

a

baby

resulting

subsequent

blindness,

held

that

in

determining accrual of the cause of action, that all of the
essential elements of the possible cause of action, towit, duty,
breach, causation, and damages, must be "discovered" before the
cause of action begins running.

All essential elements of the

possible cause of action should have reasonably been discovered
by the patient before the cause of action occurs.

In instant

case, the plaintiff did not become aware of the duty of the
health care provider, nor the breach of duty of the health care
provider, nor was she aware of any damages, until July of 1981,
which is within the statutory period.
Should she have had notice of some complication because her
husband and sister saw blood spurting from an injection.
relied

upon the health

problem thereby.

She

care providers to notify her of any

{

She did discover the following year, in July

1981, that there was a duty, that the duty had been breached, and
that

she

was

damaged,

because

of

the

complications

of

the

{

injection and/or puncture in her leg on October 22, 1980.

(

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully

submitted that the Court should have

reversed the order granting summary judgment as to defendant
I.H.C.

and

treated

"transaction".

There

the

entire

course

is no difference

of

conduct

between

an

as

one

injurious

"substance" left in the body from an injection or damage done by
7
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{

i

a needle in the course of an injection, and something left in the
body during surgery.
The trier fact should determine the question of the statue
of limitations, as provided by the legislature, and the order
granting

summary

judgment

in

favor

of

defendant

I.H.C.

be

reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

</^

no //

/

Russell A. Cannon
Attorney at Law
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